economic advantage relating to national security.

- (h) Information of such nature that an unfriendly government in possession of it would be expected to use it for purposes prejudicial to U.S. national security and which, if classified, could not be obtained by an unfriendly power without a considerable expenditure of resources.
- (i) Information which if disclosed to a foreign government would enhance its military research and development programs to the detriment of U.S. counterpart or competitive programs.
- (j) Operational information pertaining to the command and control of space vehicles, the possession of which would facilitate malicious interference with any U.S. space mission, that might result in damage to the national security.
- (k) Information which if disclosed could jeopardize the foreign relations or activities of the United States; for example, the premature or unauthorized release of information relating to the subject matter of international negotiations, foreign government information or information regarding the placement or withdrawal of NASA tracking stations on foreign territory.
- (1) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
- (m) Other categories of information which are related to national security and which require protection against unauthorized disclosure as may be determined by the Administrator. The Chairperson, NASA Information Security Program Committee, will promptly inform the Director, Information Security Oversight Office, General Services Administration (GSA) of such determinations.

[44 FR 34913, June 18, 1979, as amended at 48 FR 5890, Feb. 9, 1983]

## § 1203.401 Effect of open publication.

Public disclosure, regardless of source or form, of information currently classified or being considered for classification does not preclude initial or continued classification. However, such disclosure requires an immediate reevaluation to determine whether the information has been compromised to the extent that downgrading or declas-

sification is indicated. Similar consideration must be given to related items of information in all programs, projects, or items incorporating or pertaining to the compromised items of information. In these cases, if a release were made or authorized by an official Government source, classification of clearly identified items may no longer be warranted. Questions as to the propriety of continued classification should be referred to the Chairperson, NASA Information Security Program Committee.

## § 1203.402 Classifying material other than documentation.

Items of equipment or other physical objects may be classified only where classified information may be derived by visual observation of internal or external appearance, structure, operation, test, application or use. The overall classification assigned to equipment or objects shall be at least as high as the highest classification of any of the items of information which may be revealed by the equipment or objects, but may be higher if the classifying authority determines that the sum of classified or unclassified information warrants such higher classification. In every instance where classification of an item of equipment or object is determined to be warranted, such determination must be based on a finding that there is at least one aspect of the item or object which requires protection. If mere knowledge of the existence of the equipment or object would compromise or nullify the reason or justification for its classification, the fact of its existence should be classified.

## $\$\,1203.403$ State-of-the-art and intelligence.

A logical approach to classification requires consideration of the extent to which the same or similar information available from intelligence sources is known or is available to others. It is also important to consider whether it is known publicly, either domestically or internationally, that the United States has the information or even is interested in the subject matter. The known state-of-the-art in other nations